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Right to Counsel in Virginia-Martin v. Commonwealth and Buchan-
an v. Commonwealth
The sixth amendment guarantees to an accused the right to assistance
of counsel,' and this right is extended to state prosecutions through the
Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this right to include steps in the proceeding before the trial
itself has commenced.3 In United States v. Wade' and Gilbert v. California5
the Court held post-indictment confrontations for identification purposes to
be "critical stages" of the proceedings at which the accused is entitled to the
presence of counsel.' Although in both cases the confrontations took place
after indictment, the Court indicated that any pretrial confrontation should
be scrutinized to determine if the presence of counsel is necessary.7 Since
these decisions,' both state and federal courts have been faced with the task
1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
2,,... [N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law ... "' U.S. CoNnS. amend. XIV 1 1. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3 See Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (accused entitled to counsel during
custodial interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused entitled to
counsel during custodial interrogation); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(accused entitled to counsel from the time of arraignment until the beginning of the
trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel must be provided for de-
fendants unable to employ counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (accused
has the right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare a defense).
4 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 H~av. L. Rav. 69, 176-82
(1969). For an analysis of the lineup opinions, see Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitu-
tional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 339, 345-57 (1969).
5 388 U.S. 263 (1967). See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69,
176-82 (1967).
6 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). On March 23, 1965 an indict-
ment was returned against Wade. He was arrested on April 2, and counsel was ap-
pointed to represent him on April 26. Fifteen days later the lineup was conducted
without notice to Wade's lawyer. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
Gilbert was identified at a lineup which occurred sixteen days after indictment and
after appointment of counsel, who was not notified.
7 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). Justice Brennan stated that the
Court should "analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice." Id. at 227.
S The decisions were made prospective after June 12, 1967. See Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Stovall decision also held that an identification confrontation
may be challenged on the grounds that it was so unfair that it denied the defendant
due process of law. The Stovall decision is not within the scope of this report. For
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of determining the scope and application of this principle. Recently, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals rendered two decisions involving the right
to counsel during an on-the-scene identification and at a pre-indictment
police lineup.
In one of these cases, Martin v. Commonwealth,9 the accused was identi-
fied near the scene of a robbery shortly after the crime was committed. The
victim was driven by the police to a nearby location where three suspects
were being held for identification. These suspects were released immediately
after he informed the police that they were not the criminals. Afterwards,
the victim was driven to another location where the defendant was in cus-
tody. The identification took place while the defendant and his companion
were in the headlight beams of the police vehicle. The Virginia court held
that the circumstances of this incident did not warrant the application of
Wade.'" The court stressed that the confrontation in this case had led to the
early release of the innocent suspects and a rapid apprehension of the
criminals."
The second decision, Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 2 involved facts more
closely related to those in Wade. In Buchanan the defendant was identified
approximately twelve hours after the crime during a pre-indictment police
lineup. Again, the Virginia court refused to extend the right to counsel
to a pre-indictment confrontation. 3 This decision did not close the door
discussion of due process requirements, see Comment, Due Process Considerations in
Police Sbowup Practices, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 377 (1969).
9 210 Va. 686, 173 SE.2d 794 (1970).
'0 ld. at 691-92, 173 SE.2d at 798-99. The Court relied heavily on Russell v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the court held it not improper to return
the suspect to the scene for identification. The court recognized that the broad
language in Wade would seem to include prompt on-the-scene identifications, but
such identifications do not fall within the purview of Wade. For analysis of Russell,
see 14 Visma. L. REv. 535 (1969).
Massachusetts was the first state to confront the problem of applying Wade to an
on-the-scene confrontation. Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 NZE.2d 343
(1968).
11 Id. at 691, 173 S.E.2d at 798.
12 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
1' Id. at 667, 173 S.E.2d at 794. The court cited People v. Palmer, 41 II. 2d 571,
244 NE.2d 173 (1969), where the Illinois court held Wade and Gilbert applicable
only to post-indictment lineups. The court relied on the Supreme Court's language in
Wade and Gilbert and in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Sinmmons
the Court referred to the "lineup cases" by stating that an accused is entitled to
counsel at any "critical stage" and that a post-indictment lineup is such a stage. The
Illinois court did not discuss the language in Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404
(1968), where Justice Douglas, writing the dissenting opinion for an equally divided
Court, indicated that an identification taking place the same day as arrest and
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to all pre-indictment identifications, however, since the court indicated that
there is no fixed time between the crime and the indictment when the right
to counsel accrues.'4 The Virginia court, in rendering such a narrow inter-
pretation of Wade, has attempted to circumvent the liberal approach of the
United States Supreme Court under the guise of distinguishing Buchanan
on its facts. The superficial distinction between a pre-indictment and post-
indictment lineup obliterates the clear purpose of the Wade principle."5
The Wade decision is based on the Supreme Court's finding that con-
frontations for identification purposes are "riddled with innumerable dan-
gers."'" One possible danger is the fallibility of identifications made by
strangers." The danger of identifying an innocent suspect is increased
because of the possible improper suggestion by the police, as where the
lineup includes only one suspect resembling the description given by the
victim."8 In addition to this, experience has shown that a witness, once
before indictment, would clearly violate Wade. However, the Court refused to apply
Wade retroactively, and the case was decided on the basis of due process.
14 Id. Although the court stated that there is no fixed time when the right to counsel
accrues, the fact remains that the pre-indictment lineup in this case was held not to
be in violation of Wade. The court in referring to Stovall stated that all cases depend
on the "totality of the circumstances." In the Stovall case the Supreme Court was not
dealing with the right to counsel when they used that phrase, but rather a violation
of due process in the conduct of the confrontation. The Supreme Court never in-
dicated that the right to counsel should depend on the "totality of the circumstances."
For other cases following this strict interpretation, see Robinson v. State, 237 So. 2d
268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); State v.
Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377 (Super. Ct. 1969).
1r) The clear purpose of the Supreme Court's decision in Wade was to prevent
potential substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights. United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 227 (1967). Such prejudice would exist whether the lineup was conducted
before or after the indictment. See, e.g., Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); United States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp. 914 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Fowler,
1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 59,
250 A.2d 285 (1969); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 840 (1970).
People v. C., 32 App. Div. 2d 840, 303 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1969); State v.
Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968); Commonwealth v. Hall, 217 Pa. Super.
218, 269 A-2d 352 (1970); In re Holley, - R.I. -, 268 A.2d 723 (1970). In the
Long decision the court stated that the more informal the confrontation procedure
the greater the danger of suggestiveness.
"I United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 228-34. The Court listed such examples as:
1.) where one of six in a lineup was oriental;
2.) where one in a lineup had black hair;
3.) where a tall person was in a lineup with short people;
4.) where a young person was in a lineup with old people;
5.) where all were known to the identifying witness, except the suspect;
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having made a selection, will seldom change his identification later during the
proceedings.19 Through the presence of counsel during a confrontation these
dangers can be minimized, and thus the chances of receiving a fair trial are
enhanced.2"
Logically, the dangers enumerated by the Court are present during all
pre-trial identifications,2 yet the majority of courts refuse to extend the
Wade ruling to on-the-scene confrontations.22 Although the courts merely
distinguish Wade on its facts, the underlying reason is that such an enlarge-
ment would present numerous practical problems.2" The necessity of counsel
in this situation would require either a lawyer in every squad car or require
the police to transport all suspects to the stationhouse, where each could
6.) where there was a grossly dissimilar appearance or distinctive clothing;
7.) where police told the witness they had caught the culprit, then he -was
viewed alone;
8.) where the suspect was pointed out before or during the lineup; and
9.) where the suspect was required to try on clothes that fit only him.
19 Id. at 229.
20 Id. at 231-32. The Court did not indicate what role counsel would play at the
identification. For an analysis of counsel's role, see Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitu-
tional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagence, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 339 (1969); Comment,
Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Imple-
mentation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 65, 72-76 (1967);
Comment, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YArE L.J. 390, 396-98 (1967). In discussing the
role of counsel, most authorities agree that his presence would not prevent more subtle
suggestiveness than those mentioned in Wade.
21See Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968). It may be that on-
the-scene identifications would be more dangerous than a formal post-indictment lineup
since the victim may be physically injured as well as emotionally shaken. Also, the
lighting may be defective and the police have a greater opportunity to make improper
suggestions. Id. at 940.
22 See, e.g., Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Soloman v.
United States, 408 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); People v.
Ferguson, 7 Cal. App. 3d 13, 86 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Green, 118
M11. App. 2d 36, 254 NZ.2d 663 (1969); Parker v. State, - Ind. -, 261 NE.2d 562
(1970); McPherson v. State, - Ind. -, 253 NX.2d 226 (1969); State v. Meeks,
205 Kan. 261, 469 P.2d 302 (1970); Commonwealth v. Burnpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238
NE.2d 343 (1968); State v. Moore, 111 N.J. Super. 528, 269 A.2d 534 (Super. Ct.
1970); State v. Bertha, 4 N.C. App. 422, 167 S.E.2d 33 (1969); State v. Spencer,
24 Utah 2d 361, 471 P.2d 873 (1970). But see Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935
(5th Cir. 1968), where the court concluded that Wade applies to any lineup or any
technique employed to produce an identification; United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp.
286 (D.D.C. 1968). For discussion of the right to counsel in the lower courts, see
Comment, The Right To Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts,
36 U. Cm. L. REv. 830 (1969).
23 For a discussion of practical problems, see 14 VirL. L. REv. 535 (1969).
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contact his own attorney or one could be appointed for him.2' Where the
victim is near death and the only evidence which can be obtained is his
identification of the culprit, the requirement of counsel could result in the
criminal evading prosecution. In addition to the problems for the police,
innocent suspects found near the scene of the crime would be subjected
to police custody for a longer period of time. Under this majority view the
ruling in Martin is certainly proper.
On the other hand, a pre-indictment police lineup, such as the one in
Buchanan, is more readily adaptable to the requirement of counsel. The
exigencies present in an on-the-scene identification are not as likely in a
pre-indictment lineup, because generally a few hours have passed since the
crime and apprehension. During the time the suspect is in custody at the
stationhouse he could contact his own attorney, or one could be appointed
for him.25 Although innocent suspects would again be detained for a longer
period of time, the benefits of counsel's presence far outweigh this incon-
venience. Since the practical problems are all but eliminated and the
dangers of an incorrect identification exist, it is superficial and unwarranted
to distinguish between a post-indictment and a pre-indictment confrontation.
The Supreme Court's clear purpose in Wade was to minimize the dan-
gers of an improper identification of an innocent suspect. Most authorities
balance these risks against the burden this places on society. In so doing,
the majority holds that an accused should be guaranteed the presence of
counsel unless the circumstances of the particular case indicates that the
interests of society would be better protected by not requiring the presence
of counsel. 6 This rationale, which was espoused by the Virginia court in
Martin, could easily lead to the police holding more improper identifications
on-the-street in order to avoid the impact of the Wade decision. However,
this is the only realistic approach, in the context of current police investiga-
tion procedures and society's unwillingness to change them.
C.M.P.
24 ld. at 539.
25 1n Buchanan twelve hours had passed between the time the suspect was appre-
hended and when the lineup was conducted.
26 For a statement of the balancing involved, see McPhearson v. State, - Ind. -,
253 N.E.2d 226 (1969). For a discussion of other possible approaches, see generally
Comment, Regulation and Enforcement of Pretrial Identification Procedures, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 1296 (1969); Note, Due Process Considerations in Police Show-up Practices,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 377 (1969). For a model regulation dealing with lineups, see Read,
Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 U.CJ_A.L.
REv. 339, 388-93 (1969).
